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1. 
How many possible answers are there to the problem 
of the individuation of actions? In this dissertation 
I shall confine myself to but two answers. I will not 
state categorically that there are no other lines of 
approach to the problem. I am, however, reasonably 
confident that no other line is at all feasible and 
that no one has formulated one. There is the possi-
bility of blending the two answers with which I shall 
deal, but such a blending would at best be mere 
temporising. It should become obvious that the two 
answers are mutually antagonistic and that no such 
blending could be convincingly defended. 
John moved his finger; he pressed a button; he 
triggered a firing mechanism; he fired a missile; he 
started a nuclear war. What have we here? The two 
answers which can be given are the two answers to the 
problem on the individuation of actions. Either there 
are many different actions or there is but one action. 
If we say but one action then we adopt an Identity 
theory of action. This is the thesis which I shall 
attempt to defend. I share this endeavour with Donald 
Davidson,1 • G.E.M. Anscombe, 2• Eric D'Arcy3• and others. 
They differ among themselves on certain points and I 
disagree with some of their views. Despite such 
1. D. Davidson 'Individuation of Events' 
2. G.E •• Anscombe 'Intention' 
3. Eric D'Arcy 'Human Acts' Ch.l. 
2. 
disagreements we all hold the basic thesis of Identity 
in common. 
The opposing view is that in the above example 
there are many actions. I disagree with, and shall 
attempt to prove untenable, this view. This puts me 
into conflict with A. Goldman1 ·in particular who defends 
this Many-action thesis and mounts a many-pronged attack 
upon the Identity thesis. Arthur Danto2• is among 
those philosophers who, without directly applying 
themselves to the problem of the individuation of action, 
does put forward conceptions of action which entail 
acceptance of the any-act thesis and opposition to the 
Identity thesis, thus requiring me to attempt to under-
mine them. 
What I propose to defend then is an Identity theory. 
This does not mean however that I am going to critically 
analyse the concept of Identity in general or try to 
solve its problems. I shall assume that Identity is a 
workable concept, that it can be usefully applied in 
statements about the world, that every competent language 
user can utilise identity statements without difficulty 
in all but inevitable, obtuse, borderline cases which 
bedevil most, if not all, concepts which we employ. 
The concrete test of this is that in all (or nearly all) 
1. A. Goldman 'A Theory of Human ction•. 
2. A. Danto 'The Nature of Human ction•. 
meaningful cases where Identity is postulated, anyone 
given the relevant facts could make a negative or 
affirmative judgement in agreement with his fellows 
(who also have the relevant facts). I shall also 
assume that the critics of the Identity thesis of action 
accept these conditions without reservation. None of 
them ever give any indication to the contrary, indeed 
the arch-critic, Goldman, bases most of his opposing 
argumentation on the very fact that the concept of 
Action Identity lacks features which normal Identity 
(which is largely object identity, though it is extended 
to event identity in common usage) has. In my own 
investigations I shall, for the most part, be satisfied 
if I can show that any problem of Action Identity is 
equally a problem - or that there is a corresponding 
problem - for normal Identity. If I can do this then 
because it is already accepted that normal Identity is 
an unobjectionable concept, it follows that Action 
Identity is acceptable also. In following this 
procedure I am also required to show that a problem of 
normal Identity is a problem for Action Identity too, 
unless I can show good cause why it should be otherwise. 
Occasionally I shall make comments on problems of 
Identity in general. It may be that consideration of 
a problem in the context of Action Identity elucidates, 
and can be carried over into, any branch of Identity 
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theory; however this would be of secondary importance 
and I shall attempt to minimise, if not eliminate, such 
discussions. 
The problems of normal Identity and its basic 
characteristics will of necessity be mentioned during 
this dissertation. On the whole these too will be 
assumed to be acceptable to anyone embarking on the 
consideration of Action Identity and will not usually 
be defended by supporting argument. This may be 
considered a drawback, but I feel justified in taking 
this line. Any such arguments, except in special 
circumstances, would constitute a lengthy and unjustified 
digression from the central issue of this dissertation. 
Before pressing on with a critical assessment of 
Action Identity there are a number of preliminary points 
which must be dealt with. 
It must be made quite clear at the outset that we 
are by no means dealing with an empirical dispute when 
considering the problem of the individuation of actions. 
When it is asked whether John's moving his finger is the 
same or a different action from his pressing the button, 
it is accepted without question that what happens, be 
it one action or two, happens at the same time. We 
cannot look to the world and see two obviously distinct 
actions as would be the case if the dispute were over 
John's raising his arm and John's lowering his arm. 
This fact is accepted by both sides of the dispute -
no empirical evidence will decide the dispute either 
way. Thus it is not being held by the Many-Action 
theorists that we will observe first John moving his 
finger then, at a different time (or perhaps with a 
different finger), John pushing the button. As far 
as the movement of John's bodily parts is concerned 
there is only the movement of his finger, whether or 
not he has performed one or many actions. This will 
be made clear in later discussions. Therefore this 
problem of the individuation of actions can be fairly 
and squarely laid at the philosopher's door. 
It might be asked why I confine myself to actions. 
Why not consider the individuation of events as a whole? 
ctions after all are but a species of event. Surely 
what goes for actions will equally well apply to any 
sort of event. In fact, many of the problems which 
will be considered, and the solutions which are proposed 
could be applied to the whole field of events. But 
actions are a special type of event; they are a 
distinct sub-class. This being the case, there must be 
distinctive features of an action which it does not 
share with other types of event. These could, in fact 
do, make the individuation of actions a problem which 
differs in some aspects from the problem of the 
individuation of events in general. There are some 
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problems unique to the contemplation of actions and what 
is said on these points cannot therefore be extended to 
cover the whole field of events. This I hope will 
become evident when such points are considered. 
There is a suggestion made by R. Taylor1 • which puts 
such claims about actions to the test; in fact, if 
correct, the suggestion will make the claim that there 
are unique features of actions, over and above other 
events, untenable. This is the suggestion that "the 
presupposed distinction between those items of human 
behaviour which are actions and those which are not may 
not be a real or natural distinction. It may, on the 
contrary, be a merely relative distinction men draw for 
practical purposes - like the distinction between things 
which are, and things which are not, tools. • •• We are, 
on this view, drawing a distinction which is relative to 
certain purposes. ••• We do not find something (in the 
actor) ••• but rather • • • invest his behaviour with the 
status of an act. 11 
Now we can accept that the distinction between tools 
and non-tools is relative. Many concepts are relative 
in the way which Taylor suggests. The most obvious of 
them is that of size - of bigness. An elephant is big 
if the context is that of the whole range of animals, it 
is small in comparison to the members of the whale species. 
1. R. Taylor' ction and Purpose• p.100. 
The attribute of bigness is relative to the context in 
which we consider the object concerned. What Taylor 
is suggesting is that a bodily movement may similarly 
be labelled an action in some circumstances, and a 
non-action in others and that the ascription is correct 
in both cases. Thus the status of action will be 
relative to the context, to the circumstances, to the 
viewpoint of the observer, in some way. 
There are, it must be pointed out, two ways in which 
this relativity can be understood. The first is where 
one says that an entity of this type is an X while another 
entity of this type is a non-X (according to context). 
Thus this stone is a tool but that stone is not - though 
it could be. Similarly, this dog, a poodle, is big when 
considered in the company of all other poodles at the dog 
show. He is at the top end of the size scale when the 
scale is applied only to poodles. However, the poodle 
down the road is not big in the context of all the dogs 
in town. It is in the middle region of the size scale 
when it is encompassing all the dogs in town. 
If we ask whether a bodily movement of a certain type, 
say an arm movement, is an action while another arm move-
ment is a non-action then we will find that this is in 
fact the case. I can raise my arm as a traffic signal 
and thus perform an action, but my arm can rise to the 
same position as the result of a blow to a certain nerve 
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centre and yet not be an action. Does this mean that 
the distinction between action and non-action is relative 
in much the same way as is that between big and small or 
tool and non-tool? Such evidence is far from conclusive. 
It should be made clear that though one member of a type 
or class E may be an X while another Eis a non-X, this 
does not make the distinction between X and non-X relative. 
Let X be "a black thing." This box is a black thing, 
that box is a non-black thing. No one, surely, needs to 
be convinced that the difference between black things and 
non-black things is not a relative one. The key to the 
relativity of a concept, or otherwise, revolves around the 
question of context dependence. The stone was a tool 
because of the use to which it was put, not because of any 
intrinsic property which the stone exhibited and which we 
could identify. The dog was big in comparison with one 
group of dogs. The two dogs, the two stones, could be 
exactly similar in every way; they could be entirely 
indistinguishable - have exactly similar properties (the 
only difference between them being spatio-temporal 
location). Nevertheless it is still the case that one 
stone is a tool, the other a non-tool and that one dog 
was correctly called big, the other average in size. 
This first way in which a concept exhibits relativity 
collapses into the second way. This being where one and 
the same entity is both an X and a non-X according to 
context. Any entity which is an X could , theoretically, 
be a non-X in the right context, and vice versa, if Xis 
a relative concept. That can be both an X and a non-X 
is the direct and incontrovertible evidence that the 
distinction between X and non-Xis context dependent in 
some way - i . e. is relative . This is the test which 
action must satisfy if its relativity as· a concept is to 
be accepted. 
We need then to be able to see any bodily movement 
in two lights, in a way similar to that in which we can 
see any dog or any stone etc. Because bodily movements 
are but transitory events this cannot be done by consider-
ing the movement at different times , or by considering it 
in company with different groups of its fellows, as we 
could in considering the concept of a tool , or of size. 
What is needed is that we look at the movement from two 
viewpoints, or that two people look at it from different 
points of view, or with two purposes in mind. For instance, 
John ' s arm moves. From Henry ' s point of view the movement 
is an action; from Peter's it is a non- action. (This 
should be so if action is a relative concept.) Further , 
when the situation is explained to John he will be able 
to agree that the movement of his arm could be correctly 
considered as both an action and a non-action according 
to which way one looks at it. If such viewpoints are 
not possible then the relativity of the concept of action 
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is effectively disproved. It must be noted that this 
duality of view should apply to any bodily movement; 
i.e. any bodily movement could rightly be considered as 
an action and as a non-action. In the same way, any 
object could be considered to be big or small according 
to point of view; any object could be picked up and 
used to do a job thus becoming a temporary tool. 
t first it seems that this could be done. If I 
see John 1 s arm move I do not know if it is an action or 
a non-action. There seems to be nothing native to the 
movement, no characteristic, which when present would 
enable us to pick it out as an action; when absent, as 
a non-action. 
The case is weakened when it is realised that there 
is a class of bodily movements whose members cannot ever 
be considered actions - e.g. the beating of one 1 s heart. 
There are bodily movements which are obviously caused 
by some observable event, e.g. one 1 s leg being struck by 
a runaway wheelbarrow and moving as a consequence. 
Even if 'bodily movements• is restricted to rule out 
heart action and like automatic processes, (as would 
probably be Taylor's interpretation of the term), which 
have no observable event as their chief cause, there are 
still criteria available for making a judgement for or 
against a movement being an action. We can usually 
recognise other people's actions and distinguish them 
from their non-actions. We do this largely by observing 
- ~ 
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the~ in which the movement occurs. It looks to be 
controlled; it is co-ordinated with other movements, 
other actions, to form purposive patterns of behaviour. 
It is usually an observable characteristic of a bodily 
movement which is an action that the performer is 
it . 
concentrating on - this is a trait always absent in the 
occurrence of non-action movements. We can see that 
the action movement is not one "without rhyme or reason;" 
it is purposive. Such factors - usually a combination 
of them - allows us to readily distinguish actions from 
non-actions. Granted I can be mistaken, I can also be 
tricked. A person can perform an action and yet fool 
me into thinking it was an involuntary movement, but he 
can only do so by knowing (and knowing that I know) that 
certain features (such as are outlined above) are typically 
features of actions, while their absence is characteristic 
of non-action behaviour. He consciously excludes or 
suppresses these features from his performance, i.e. he 
feigns non-action behaviour. For example, he pretends 
to slip when he deliberately pushes his wife under a bus. 
Thus he knows and I know - we all know - when any one 
bodily movement, even when viewed in isolation from 
extended behaviour sequences, has action features and 
when not, and hence whether or not it is an action. 
It is only because of this mutual knowledge that our 
trickster can attempt to deceive us and that he can 
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succeed. If we are afforded a clear observation of a 
bodily movement, and we are concentrating on it, and no 
deliberate subterfuge is being employed, then we should 
be able to make a firm (and correct) decision as to 
whether or not it is an action. Here then are character-
istics - though they are rather subtle - which actions 
have and non-actions lack and which we are all able to 
recognise. Clearly then the distinction between action 
and non-action is not merely relative. 
There is also a very clear ability in everyone to 
know when a movement of his body was an action. This 
is in fact stronger than ordinary knowing; we are aware 
of performing an action in a way similar to our awareness 
of pains. In both cases we 'know• in a way which is 
beyond doubt, beyond the need for proof which is a 
feature of ordinary knowledge acquisition. (Wittgenstein 
gives a fUller account of such 'knowing' in "Philosophical 
Investigations § 246.) This is not to say that for 
every movement of one's body one will, without hesitation, 
be able to say whether or not it is an action. There is 
a border region of difficulty between action and non-action. 
For instance, I decide to go to the window. I do so 
deliberately, knowingly, voluntarily. This, we would say, 
is an action. However, to get to the window I have to 
walk across the room. The individual steps I take are 
__per f ormecf 
not so deliberately , yet my crossing the room to 
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go to the window is no more than the sum total of those 
steps. Is each of the steps an action or not? This 
is debatable. One could expect varying answers from a 
cross-section of the community, (as one certainly would 
not if one asked about my looking out the window). The 
same sort of problem exists for pains. Where is the 
boundary between violent itching and pain? Such border 
difficulties confront most, if not all, concepts. This 
by no means brands a concept as an unworkable one. 
Besides the observable characteristics mentioned -
which alone suffice to make the Taylor suggestion 
untenable - there are other features of action which are 
absent in non-action behaviour. It is worthwhile to 
set up such a feature as a defining criterion and thus 
give an outline of action characterisation. This might 
help us deal with the difficult cases and it will 
certainly be useful in dealing with objections to the 
Identity thesis. We may intuitively distinguish actions 
from non-actions but we need to know how this can be done 
in concrete terms if we are to be able to argue cogently 
about any aspect of action (as we surely will be in our 
consideration of the Identity thesis). 
The least specific, but still useful, way suggested 
for differentiating actions from non-actions is by point-
ing out that, within the sphere of bodily movements, there 
is a division between things we do and things which happen 
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to us. Things which happen to us can apply alike to 
movements of our bodies which are involuntary, non-
deliberate, reflex, etc. - e.g. one's heartbeat - and 
to bodily movements which are caused by some outside 
agency or event. Unfortunately, not all things we 
can rightly be said to do can qualify as actions. For 
example, instances of habitual behaviour are things 
we do but they are not actions. Also, consider the 
following, perfectly legitimate answer to a question 
as to what I do: 11 ! just sit and wait;" again, this 
is not an action. Thus this distinction is not suffi-
cient to characterise actions. It is useful because, 
though not ~11 things we do are actions, all actions 
are things we do, and cognizance of this fact gives us 
a dependable way of finding out what is not an action. 
Taylor suggests the unique property of actions is 
responsibility, or rather, that it is a movement for 
which the owner of the body is responsible. 1 • This 
though is a word which features in, and always has 
overtones of, moral discourse. Though we might seem 
sometimes to use 11 responsible" other than in connection 
with morality - i.e. with actions having forseen con-
sequences (or which are expected to) which have an 
effect on other people's welfare (on the sphere of 
human relations) - it is, even in such instances, used 
1. op.cit. p.100. 
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to convey reproval. 11Who is responsible for this mess? 11 
puts the actor on the defensive or makes him feel guilty. 
11Responsible 11 is a moral-context word. In fact it is 
more concerned with the consequences of an action than 
an action itself. "You are responsible for moving your 
finger," (when there are no consequences) is a misplaced 
comment. This property while being peculiar to the 
sphere of action , is not a successful defining character-
istic of action because it cannot rightly be applied to 
all actions. 
Shwayder suggests that 11 an act(~ provisionally 
1. defined as an item of behaviour with a purpose. 11 This 
definition is also deficient. gain it is more concerned 
with the consequences than the action. For an action 
which has no consequences it presents a problem. What 
was the purpose of my raising my hand to touch my nose? 
Suppose that I did not intend to make a signal, or 
scratch an itch, or in fact have any other purpose. The 
only candidate for a purpose in such a case would be to 
touch my nose with my hand. Which is the more correct 
answer in such a case to a query about purpose? (i) 
11 1 had no purpose 11 or (ii) "to touch my nose with my 
hand?" I think it must be agreed that ( i ) is the 
correct response. (ii) would be a poor attempt at 
humour, or something of the kind. The consequence 
1. D. Shwayder ' The Stratification of Behaviour• p.31 
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of an action, (or at least the expected consequence), 
is what we refer to when we speak of the purpose of 
an action; the purpose will not be the bodily movement 
itself. But as has been demonstrated, there are actions 
with no intended consequences which produce no notice-
able results . These are 11 idle 11 actions , which are 
intuitively accepted as actions and must be accommodated 
into our theory as such , but cannot properly be said to 
have any purpose whatsoever. 
Closely akin to "purposes" are reasons for an 
action. If one does an action to achieve a purpose, 
the desire to achieve that purpose was the main reason 
for the action. Here too an idle action would slip 
through the net. There was no real reason for perform-
ing it, it was done on a whim, done on the spur of the 
moment for no reason, we would say. Thus reasons fail 
as a defining characteristic for much the same reasons 
as do purposes . 
These "idle" actions which we have uncovered must 
be captured in the action characterisation and in that 
they are those actions which are the most elementary -
the closest true actions to the border between action 
and non-action - they are the sub-class of actions upon 
which to concentrate our attention when searching for 
the defining characteristic. They are after all 
entitled to be called actions only because they have 
the defining characteristic , whatever it is. They 
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lack the other typical (though not universal) properties 
of more "full fleshed" actions . 
I think that the necessary property is that the 
bodily movement be deliberate or intended. One could 
balk at intended; for instance, one might intend to 
harm John, but help him instead, by one's action. 
Thus my action - i.e . helping John - was not intended, 
but an action nonetheless. Remember however that we 
are dealing here with bodily movements - with items of 
human behaviour - and attempting to discover a criterion 
for separating those items which are actions from those 
whi ch are not. If I intend to move my arm but my leg 
moves instead, then the movement of my leg could not be 
considered an action (in fact I doubt that it is even a 
possibility for a normal person - for any person at all). 
If I decide to move my arm then my arm alone will move -
unless it is somehow restrained. Thus if we confine 
ourselves to the simplest and most direct type of 
descriptions of actions, (tokens of which could describe 
any action), i.e. as a bodily movement, then the objection 
to saying that an action is intentional is overcome 
because we are merely saying that all actions are 
intentional bodily movements , which is true of all actions 
and false of all other bodily movements. (This problem 
is further examined later.) 
The logical grammar of deliberate performance is 
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similar to that of intentional performance though it may 
be superior in some respects. Deliberateness is some-
thing which characterises the action as it is performed. 
Intention is usually something which precedes the action. 
Deliberateness, though closely related to intention does 
therefore fit better than the latter. Some action 
descriptions present it with the same problem as con-
fronted intention, but the same retort will rescue it. 
Thus we have arrived at a succinct and accurate 
definition of an action as a deliberately performed 
bodily movement. Thus we are now able to identify 
actions and know how we identify them. We know that 
they are intrinsically different from other bodily 
movements (types of behaviour), or any other type of 
event. Thus, in this study of the Identity thesis of 
action we know just what we are dealing with - what we 
are claiming to be identical with one another (forgive 
the built in bias towards the visualising of two or 
more actions where there is only one, in this locution). 
By establishing this we avoid possible complications 
and difficulties which might apply to certain events, 
but not to actions, (a point we may otherwise have 
overlooked). 
This definition of action rests on the assumption 
that all actions are bodily movements and therefore 
events. Even speech acts can be interpreted as such. 
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However, there is the so-called 11act of restraint" which 
is hard to reconcile with t his requirement. I am not 
talking about acts of will, mental acts which are divorced 
from the physical world. The whole concept of mental 
acts and mental events is suspect. It is a hotly disputed 
question in contemporary philosophy as to whether they 
even exist or not. To discuss this issue would entail 
a lengthy and complicated procedure. By the above 
definition of an action they would not be actions. I 
will not state categorically that there is no such thing 
as a mental act, but I am concerned only with physical 
acts and will assume for the purposes of this dissertation 
that there are only physical actions. If you balk at 
this then just read "physical act" wherever I have written 
"action." 
There is a physical variety of restraint act. They 
do involve actual physical forces. Suppose an external 
force is applied to my arm. If I do nothing my arm will 
move. However I can do something, I can resist the force 
and keep my arm in the same position, or at least retard 
the movement. This restraint provides an acceptable 
answer to the question ttWhat did you do?" - a question 
which can be asked (and answered) of any action. It is 
done deliberately and would be considered an item of 
behaviour. Common usage would favour its being called 
an action, and indeed it seems to qualify as such in all 
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salient respects except that of being a bodily movement 
and hence an event. I assumed earlier that actions 
were but a species of event. It is important that this 
be so because much of what I shall say about actions in 
the discussion of the Identity thesis depends upon their 
being events also - though of a special kind, with a 
unique feature(s). 
In acts of restraint there is always an interplay 
of forces. Could we say that an event, in the broadest 
sense, is an interplay of forces? Unfortunately this is 
not of itself sufficient to characterise an event. 
Consider a stone at rest on the ground. Here we have a 
situation which involves an interplay of forces. The 
force of gravity constantly attracts the stone towards 
the centre of the earth; the bodily resistance of earth 
and stone (ultimately describable in terms of inter-
molecular forces) resists any further falling of the 
stone. The forces are in equilibrium. What is further 
needed for an event to occur is that the equilibrium be 
disturbed. But in acts of restraint there seems to be 
an equilibrium set up,(or maintained) not one disturbed. 
However, this setting up of a static equilibrium is 
enforced by the agent. An intrusive force is applied 
to my arm. An event - the movement of my arm - should 
naturally follow. It does not; the act of restraint 
intrudes into the arena and forcibly maintains the 
'-------- ----------- -- -
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equilibrium. This restraint is an event. I deliberately 
oppose natural forces; I intrude into the "free-flow" of 
the natural chain of events and bring about consequences 
which the natural world - left alone - would not have 
produced. This is equally true of normal acts and acts 
of restraint and makes any attempt to seriously distinguish 
the two as distinctly different categories, in any 
important sense, highly misguided. Both types are events, 
the only difference being that one sort initiates events 
which would not otherwise have occurred, the other sort 
interrupts and suppresses events which would otherwise 
have occurred. They are the two sides of the same coin. 
I previously said that all actions constitute bodily 
movements. I think we can legitimately stretch a point 
and say that the muscular effort comprising acts of 
restraint be considered as bodily movements. (We have 
shown that they are events, and clearly they are items 
of behaviour.) Thus they are able to fit into the defini-
tion of action which we have formulated. 
Another problem to be faced before a detailed investi-
gation of the Identity thesis of action is undertaken 
stems from a suggestion of Davidson 1 s. 1 • ccording to 
this suggestion neither "John moved his finger" nor 
"John pressed the button 11 picks out an identifiable 
action. He says "The temptation to treat a sentence 
1. D. Davidson ' The Individuation of Events' p.222. 
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like nDoris capsized the canoe yesterday" as if it 
contained a singular term referring to an action (is 
incorrect and) we should be steadfast in resisting it." 
This is how he justifies his claim: "··· ordinary 
sentences about events, like 'Doris capsized the canoe 
yesterday,' are related to particular events in just the 
same way that 'There is a mosquito in here' is related 
to particular mosquitoes: It is no less true that Doris 
capsized the canoe yesterday if she capsized it a dozen 
times than if she capsized it once; nor, if she capsized 
it a dozen times does it make sense to ask, 'Which time 
are you referring to?' as if this were needed to clarify 
'Doris capsized the canoe yesterday' .n The point being 
that sentences like this do not name or describe any 
particular action, and do not contain any elements which 
do so, and hence that they do not refer to any one action 
in particular. 
This is an important issue in the context of the 
Identity thesis because if "Doris capsized the canoe 
yesterday" and "Doris tipped us all into the water 
yesterday" are not both about a specific event, a parti-
cular action, then how could it possibly be said that 
there is but one action here, the same in both cases? 
One could not. Identity between specific entities 
only can be postulated. One must be able to go through 
the process of identifying a particular entity before its 
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identity with another entity (or rather, as that which 
two utterances refer to), can even be postulated. 
Identity necessarily depends upon the prior possibility 
of definitely identifying each entity which is represent-
ed by a term in the Identity statement. If Davidson is 
right then this essential prior step is impossible and 
the Identity statement could not therefore be meaning-
fully made. Unless the sentences involved describe or 
name - and in so doing refer to - a particular action, 
then any postulation of identity is misguided. I am 
prepared to differ with Davidson on the nature of these 
sentences. He wants to say that only when what is said 
is constructed so that we have such phrases as "the 
capsizing of the canoe by Doris yesterday," "the pressing 
of the button by John," etc., can identity claims be 
attempted. Then the identity could be phrased thus: 
"The pressing of the button by John was the launching of 
the missile by John. 11 Here the "the ••• " phrases refer 
to a specific action just as "the third man from the left 11 
and 11Sir Francis Drake" refer to the same object. 
Is it not however the case that in almost any 
conversation in which it would be uttered, "Doris cap-
sized the canoe" would be assumed by both speaker and 
hearer to be about one particular event? 
example would be: 
uestion: "Why are you late?" 
Answer: "Doris capsized the canoe. 11 
A typical 
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uestion: "Where did she do it'? Not out by the 
point '? 11 
Answer: "Yes that ' s right. She turned too 
sharply and we capsized." 
uestioner: "Just as I thought. It ' s the third 
time she ' s done that this week." 
I think it is quite evident that what both 
questioner and answerer are concerned with and are 
talking about (and mutually recognising the fact) is 
a definite, specific action. 
context. 
This is conveyed by the 
Whether we want to say that a sentence such as 
"Doris capsized the canoe" can refer or describe, or not, 
we must say that it is about something. To this extent 
Davidson and I agree. However Davidson assumes that if 
what it is about is explicitly stated, it will be an 
"a ••• " phrase; e.g. "a capsizing of the canoe by Doris." 
In point of fact it could well be, and in most cases 
would be, a "the ••• " phrase; e.g. "the capsizing of the 
canoe by Doris." Which it is will be conveyed by the 
context - by the rest of the conversation or explanation 
Taken in isolation or whatever of which it is a part • 
we would not know whether an "a • • • 11 or a II the ••• " 
interpretation was indicated. In other words , in 
isolation such a sentence is ambiguous. 
If we were trying to construct a formal identity 
statement of then = B" form then we would need two 
explicitly referring phrases as substitution instances 
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of A and B. We canassert that "the pressing of the 
button is identical with the launching of the rocket." 
We clearly cannot assert "John pressed the button is 
identical with John launched the rocket" and hope to 
make sense. The only way to make this assertion 
meaningful is to place quotation marks thus: 11 1 John 
pressed the button• is identical with 'John launched 
the rocket• "which, while meaningful, is not an action 
identity statement, and is false anyway. 
Though there is this trouble about making a formal 
identity statement this does not prevent us from making 
the identity claim that what each of the two sentences 
is about - what it tells of (which is undeniably an 
action) - is one and the same thing. This we can do 
when we assume (or when we know) that the context makes 
what the sentence is about a specific, not an unspecified 
action. Thus when we look at a number of different 
sentences, with different meanings, each about an action, 
we can meaningfully ask (on many occasions) whether they 
are about one or many actions. 
I think it permissible to say that such sentences 
as 11 John pressed the button 11 are descriptive. In fact, 
a blend of a descriptive and a referring element. 
Consider the question "What did X do?", this can be 
asked in connection with any action. Depending on 
context, it could be asking when and where the action 
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was performed, e.g. Everyone at the party shuns John and 
mutters such reproaches as '~lhat a cad; chap should 
never have gotten away with it." Peter then asks "What 
did he do?" He expect the answer to pick out a certain 
action or actions of John from his past history. In 
other words he wants the answer to refer to an action. 
Also called for is a descriptive element. One could 
even say that when the reply to the question is "He 
killed Jack" or "He insulted the queen" etc., then it is 
in some way naming the action - to the extent that any 
action can be named. One can ask "What did you call 
what he did?" and receive the reply "murdering Jack," 
which is a common procedure for eliciting the name of a 
person, an object, or an event. In such sentences as 
11He killed Jack" we cannot say there is a full-fledged 
naming; there is though something which performs much 
the same function. There is definitely a reference to 
a particular action. 
Combined with this referring - perhaps naming -
element is descriptive material (which is not so common 
in the outright naming of objects etc.). The same 
sentence, while doing the referring job, also imparts a 
lot of descriptive detail of the action. By the very 
mention of the word "murder" we know that there was a 
victim who died, and died as a result of a bodily 
movement of the actor, and that the actor had intended 
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this movement to have this result. 
The main problem with claiming that n did Y" is a 
description, or rather contains a description, is that 
a descriptive passage always has to be a description of 
something (obviously), and that thing which is described 
must be named or referred to in the sentence in which 
the description is embodied. here must always be a 
name or referring phrase 1 • to which the descriptive 
detail can be conjoined. This seems to be absent in 
the case of typical action sentences. If"John pressed 
the button" contains descriptive detail about an action, 
where is the 'A' which refers to the action? 'John' is 
a name, but of a person, not of an action. What we need 
then, and seem to lack, is the 1 1 to stand for the 
action. However, as we have already noted, we do have 
a naming function performed which allows us to realise 
what entity the descriptive details are describing. We 
can say that the button pressing by John is the action 
referred to. The descriptive element is indistinguish-
able from the referring one. To show that a similar 
state of affairs can occur in connection with objects, 
consider "The large, flat, well-worn old cap ••• , 11 where 
much descriptive detail is built into the reference to 
the object. 
Consider what we do when discussing a happening. 
We say "John pressed the button." We do indicate an 
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event. After the event we can refer to "John's pressing 
of the button." This is similar to the procedure of 
numbering soldiers in a line. The N.C.O. goes dovm. the 
line, stopping at each man, saying 11You are six from the 
end" etc., making a seemingly pure factual statement but 
doing so in order that he can later refer to "the sixth 
man from the end" etc. 
In the action statement we also undoubtedly convey 
something about the happening to the listener because 
after he hears that John pressed the button then he knows 
about the happening, who and what were involved and also 
what sort of event it was, i.e. an action, further, a 
pressing action. In that one learns something about the 
happening from the sentence, it must, broadly speaking, 
include a description. Whether we can capture the 
mechanics of the descriptive method so employed within a 
framework of formal logic or not does not alter this 
fact. The speaker wishes to convey information about 
an entity - an action. The hearer gains information 
about an entity. Some sort of description undeniably 
has been made. The fact that we may not know just how 
this was done makes no difference to this fact. Thus 
I am justified in saying that such a sentence is a 
description of an action or that it refers to an action. 
It must be pointed out that our Identity statements 
are not primarily concerned with the actor. Though an 
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Identity statement such as "Sam Clement's shaking of the 
President's hand is identical with ark Twain's shaking 
of the President's hand" is identity of actions, this 
sort of statement is not what the Identity thesis of 
action is postulated to explain. Such an Identity 
statement revolves around the identity of persons. It is 
primarily a problem in object identity, though one can be 
misled because it is couched in terms of action identity. 
The preliminary points have now been made. They 
have paved the way for the main task - the critical assess-
ment of the Identity thesis of action. The limits within 
which discussion of this thesis should be confined have 
been discovered. Possible avenues of digression have been 
closed off and initial problems overcome. We have set the 
stage, so to speak, for our main task. 
Let us now turn to the supposed problems which con-
front the Identity thesis of action. 
The primary requirement for any Identity statement 
to hold true is that it obey Leibniz's Law. Thus if 
and Bare identical then must have all and only the 
properties that B has. Such a characterisation can lead 
to trouble because there is a tendency to confuse the 
actual action with the names or phrases which stand for 
it. In fact it is weighted against Identity. If we 
talk in this way, we refer to "the two actions (or 
objects etc.) and B which are identical." What more 
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confusing statement could confront one? In the same 
breath it is said that there are two actions, and that 
there is only one, (if is identical with B then there 
is only one entity). To overcome this confusion it is 
advisable to revise Leibniz's Law, or rather to restate 
it in a manner which captures its essence more accurately , 
less opaquely. The recast Law becomes: "I f what' ' refers 
1 I to is identical with what 'B ' refers to , then what 
refers to must have all and only the properties which 
1. 
that which ' B' refers to has. 11 
There are a number of instances where this Law does 
not appear to hold if we uphold the Identity thesis of 
action, (which I have, and shall, refer to as simply the 
Identity thesis). That is, there appear to be a number 
of cases where the Identity thesis would allow that action 
is identical with action B, but it seems that they do 
not share all the same properties . (Forgive the lapse 
into a confusing mode of expression about Identity. This 
is done from habit and for brevity. The mode of express-
ion employed in the recasting of Leibniz's Law should 
always be kept in mind.) Unless we are prepared to 
dispute Leibniz ' s Law then such seeming anomalies in the 
properties of identical actions must be cleared up -
shown to be mistaken. I have no intention of disputing 
Leibniz's Law - this is part of the theory about Identity 
1 . Logically symbolised the Law_states 
( x )( y )L (x = y) :> (RS )(.kh =.. f)yl/ . 
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which I have pledged to presuppose. Therefore my 
defence of the Identity thesis must depend upon my 
ability to demonstrate that no such anomalies stand up 
to rigorous scrutiny. 
any of these so-called property anomalies are 
1. found in Goldman who mounts a concerted attack on the 
Identity thesis. Let us now attempt to topple his 
arguments (and some others) and demonstrate that in 
fact no property anomalies exist when the Identity thesis 
allows that two actions are identical. 
The first example is based on Goldman's failure to 
separate the consequences of an action from the action 
itself, in his mind. He asks us to "Consider the act of 
John's killing Smith and consider the event consisting 
in the gun's going off. Is it true to say that this act 
caused this event, that John's killing Smith caused the 
gun to fire? 2. surely not." 
This conclusion of Goldman's is wrong. He is right 
to maintain that a statement such as "John's killing 
Smith caused the gun to go off" would be very odd; in 
normal speech we would not run across it. This oddness 
can however be explained without resorting to the denial 
of the Identity thesis. Such a statement is strictly 
speaking true, though useless. 
Goldman seems to be unaware of the fact that 
1. A. Goldman' Theory of Human ction' Chapter 1. 
2. op.cit. p.2. 
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"to kill" means no more and no less than "to cause the 
death of." When we realise this we can recast our 
statement thus: "John's act which caused Smith's death 
caused the gun to fire." We are assuming that the 
cause was an action of John's. Thus what we are claiming 
here is that one action of John's both caused the death 
of Smith and caused the gun to fire. Obviously this 
could be the case. John's act - i.e. his deliberately 
performed bodily movement - could have caused the gun to 
fire and Smith to die. The action would have been a move-
ment of his finger in such a way as to cause the trigger 
to move, which in turn caused the gun to fire, which in 
its turn caused a projectile to strike and bring about 
the death of Smith. Thus we have a causal chain in which 
the first link is John's action, the third is the firing 
of the gun and the last is the death of Smith. It is a 
matter of judgement as to whether John's action is the 
primary cause of Smith's demise; i.e. whether it 
initiated a train of events which resulted in Smith's 
death (which would not otherwise have occurred). This 
judgement is already made, (we shall assume correctly), 
when John's act is described as a killing. It is also, 
of course, the primary cause of the gun's firing. There 
is nothing wrong with saying that some event caused a 
series of other events (and hence caused events further 
along the causal chain). It only immediately caused 
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the movement of the trigger, but saying that an event 
is the cause of another is not synonymous with saying 
that it is the immediate cause. It could be a mediate 
(though still primary) cause. I think we can all agree 
that in this case John ' s action undoubtedly qualifies 
as the cause of Smith ' s death even though it is but a 
mediate cause. It is also agreed, I am sure, that 
John ' s action was the cause of the gun's discharging. 
Thus technically it is unobjectionable and true to say 
that John ' s act of killing Smith was also the act which 
caused the gun to fire. 
The reason why we do not find such statements in 
normal discourse (i.e . why they are so odd) is that when 
we state the cause of an event - here the discharge of 
the gWl (the event, not the action ) - we are almost 
always giving an explanation; we are tracing the history 
of events which led up to this event. We are telling 
what event or events caused it. If one "explained" that 
what caused the gun to go off was what caused the gun to 
go off one would be making an empty statement; it would 
be a tautology void of explanatory content. In that we 
are supposed to be explaini ng, we have made a redundant 
statement; it is an odd statement , a misguided one. 
It is nonetheless a true one . It would be even more odd 
if we stated that the cause of B was the cause of C when 
B itself is less advanced in the causal chain than C. 
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s an explanation it is absolutely worthless. What is 
required is explicit mention of , the event in the 
chain preceding B. An explanation requires us to trace 
the causal chain back, not bring up what else occurred 
later in the chain (always remember that the reference 
is to A in the case both of 11 the cause of B" and "the 
case of C11 , but it is an opaque reference). An explana-
tion which fails to do this is not explanatory; it is 
odd and redundant; it is a pseudo explanation. In some 
contexts though it could be useful. The utterer may 
have reason to believe that the event is known to the 
listener under the description "cause of Smith's death" 
though not under the description "cause of the gun's 
discharge." 
It is clear then that such statements, while on 
most occasions being understandably odd, are nonetheless 
true. What Goldman was trying to prove was that though 
John's pulling the trigger and John's killing Smith 
would be identical according to the Identity thesis, 
they in fact failed to have one property in common -
namely, being the cause of the gun ' s discharge. We 
have seen that this is mistaken, that the same bodily 
movement can be the cause of Smith ' s death, the cause 
of the moving of the trigger and the cause of the gun's 
discharging and that when John's pulling the trigger 
and John's killing Smith are identical under the Identity 
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thesis, then whatever one causes, the other causes. 
The second problem is based on the supposed dis-
parity in the causes of two identical actions. "If A 
and A'are one and the same action, then they are one and 
the same event. And if they are one and the same event, 
one would expect them, if they were caused at all, to be 
caused by the same set of events or states of affairs. 
If we find, on the contrary, that A and 'have somewhat 
different causes or causal factors, that would give us 
reason to conclude that A and A'are not the same after 
a11. 111 • Goldman expresses the requirement very well. 
How does he demonstrate that it is contravened? 
His best example is as follows. George replaced a 
burned-out light bulb just before John comes along and 
flips the switch. John then claims to have turned on 
. 2. the light. s Goldman sees it, George's screwing in 
the light bulb was a necessary factor 11 enabling" or 
"making possible 11 John's turning on the light. He hesi-
tates to call this factor a cause but whatever it is, it 
is a property of John's turning on the light but not of 
his flipping the switch. 
Let us look more closely at this persuasive example. 
When we say John turned on the light here, we mean that 
some action of his caused the light to go on. Thus a 
valid substitute for '' ••• turned on the light II is "caused 
1. op.cit. p.3. 
2. op.cit. p.4. 
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the light to go on. 11 Likewise a clumsy substitute :for 
":flipping the switch" would be "causing the switch to 
assume the 1 on 1 position." These both involve events 
which are not actions (i.e. consequences) - the coming 
on o:f the bulb and the movement of the switch to a new 
position. Any event must have as its primary cause 
another event (with the possible exception of an action 
- if the Agency theory of act causation is accepted). 
One might list necessary conditions among its causal 
factors, but these - I hope we all agree - are at best 
but secondary causes. However this may be, once we 
expand the descriptions of the two actions in contention 
we can see that both of them are claimed to be causes of 
certain events. The Identity thesis proclaims that both 
these causes coincide - are in fact but one event, one 
action. If George claimed that he turned on the light 
(or at least helped to do so) then he is claiming that 
his action was a primary cause of the event - the 
brightening of the bulb. He has every right to do so, 
though I am confident in saying that he is mistaken in 
this case as his action merely provided one o:f the 
necessary conditions in which John's action could 
become the primary cause of the light's brightening. 
Be that as it may, even i:f George is right in his 
claim, he is still not claiming to be causing or in any 
way bringing about John's action, which was just a 
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certain bodily movement. All he .£.ml claim,right or wrong, 
is that he helped bring about the consequence which John 
had claimed was due to his action alone. He is able to 
dispute that John's action had all the effects claimed for 
it, but as to the action of John's itself, he had no part 
whatsoever in it. To claim to do so would not make sense. 
It would entail George somehow bringing about a movement 
of John's body which John performed deliberately which is 
more than impossible; it is not even conceivable. It is 
contradictory. George neither caused nor made it possible 
that John performed his action. This he could only claim 
to do for the claimed consequence of that action - a dis-
tinct event in its own right. George could claim, with 
some justice, that his action made possible, or enabled, 
John's action to be described as that which caused the 
light to come on (i.e. as turning on the light). Granted 
his action could not likewise be said to have made possible 
the description of the same action as the cause of the 
switch's being on (i.e. of flipping the switch), but the 
way in which the action is described is not a property of 
the action. If it is a property of anything, it is a 
property of the way in which~ regard the action and its 
effects on the world. This is entirely different from 
being a property of the action itself. 
We still have not found a disparity in properties 
between "two" actions which would qualify as identical 
38. 
under the Identity thesis. 
Goldman has another example along the same lines.1 • 
He maintains that the reason a man says "Yes?" when he 
answers the phone, and the reason he says it loudly, 
are not the same. He says "Yes?" because he wants to 
know who is calling; he says it loudly because he is 
angry. I think I need do more than draw attention to a 
parallel case for objects which would have to be accepted 
as identical if the notion of Identity is accepted at all, 
in any manner or form (which Goldman certainly does). 
"This is a ball." "This is a heavy ball." We are 
talking about what no one for a moment would doubt is one 
and the same object. Yet it is a ball because it is 
spherical; a heavy ball because it is made of lead. This 
in no way leads us to postulate the presence of two balls. 
Nor does the parallel case of answering the phone lead us 
to believe that there are two actions. All that is in-
volved is a difference between the reason for doing some-
thing and the reason for doing it in the way in which it 
was done. It is definitely not a case of A and ' failing 
to have a property in common. There is I think an "A", but 
no " 1 11 present. If we did have A identical to an A' 
then any reason for one would be a reason for the other, 
however this case does not even aspire to have two names, 
"A" and II I ti • Goldman fails, with this type of example 
1. op.cit. p .3. 
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of "contraventions" of Leibniz's Law, to do any harm to 
the Identity thesis. 
A property which and A' do not seem always to 
hold in common is being intended. I wave goodbye; I 
knock over my glass. I did both by moving my arm, hence 
I would say that the actions are identical. The one arm 
movement both constituted a farewell gesture and caused 
the glass to fall over. The problem is that it was my 
intention to make the farewell gesture, but it was not my 
intention to cause the toppling of the glass. This can 
be dealt with. l'fhile I might not have intended that my 
action have a certain consequence, I did, if it was indeed 
an action (i.e. a deliberate bodily movement) intend to 
make the bodily movement in question. Thus there was but 
one action which I fully intended to make, I also intended 
that it be a farewell gesture, though I did not forsee -
therefore did not intend - that the glass would fall over. 
This question ties in with considerations of action 
descriptions, which I shall come to later, therefore I 
will take up the task of further explanation of this type 
of case at that time. Just suffice it to say here that 
the bodily movement was intended, though one of its effects 
was not. This though does not constitute a missing 
property in the action - knocking over the glass - itself, 
which waving farewell has, then this is not a case of A 
having a property which A' lacks. 
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Consider = B where A is morally wrong but Bis 
morally neutral. A= John's striking George on the head. 
B = John's swinging his arm. The property of being 
morally wrong does not seem to be common to them both, 
though we wish to say that they are identical. If we 
consider the matter carefully however, we will see that 
in fact moral wrongness is "shared. •1 Remember that 
Leibniz's Law is more accurately stated as "If what 'A' 
stands for is identical with what 'B' stands for, then 
what 'A' refers to has all and only the properties which 
what 'B' refers to has." With this in mind we can see 
that this problem of moral values cannot harm the Identity 
thesis. 
What' ' refers to is an arm movement which had the 
consequence of George's head receiving a knock. 'B' refers 
to just the same movement with just the same consequence. 
Now 'A' mentions this consequence (and let us assume that 
the word "strike" implies tha t it was an intended conse-
quence), where 'B' does not. Therefore, if we know of 
this action through description 'B' alone (and have not 
observed the act itself) then we will not be able to make 
a moral judgement. If we hear description 1 1 then we 
can make that judgement. This just shows that' 1 is a 
fuller description than 'B'. The action is morally wrong 
regardless of the description employed, but our ability 
to make this judgement is dependent on the completeness 
>+1. 
(at least from the point of view of mentioning intended 
consequences) of the description of it with which we are 
supplied. Again there is no property of the action 
referred to in 'A' which the action referred to in 'B' 
fails to have, if there is but one bodily movement 
referred to by both ( i.e. if they are identical). 
' B1 fails to imply a property of the action which 
1A' implies. This is to do with the descriptions not 
with the action or actions they describe. 
D' Arcy, a supporter of the Identity thesis, has a 
theory about a concept he calls elision. Though he does 
not realise it, if this concept is a tenable one then it 
presents a serious difficulty for the Identity thesis. 
His theory is that "We may say that acBeth stabbed Duncan 
and, as a consequence, killed him: but we also simply say 
that he killed him ••••• We may often elide one possible 
description (of an action), the term X, into another term 
Y, where (1) Y is the result or consequence of the agent 
A's doing X; (2) A is nevertheless said to be doing Y, 
e . g. entertaining people; (3) the elision is so complete 
that Y gives no hint of the specific nature of X." 1 • 
The reason why elision fits into this discussion of 
possible breaches of Leibniz ' s Law is that, i f it indeed 
captures the actual state of affairs, then we have A and 
' supposedly identical but with a difference in conse-
quences. If A and ' are identical then any consequence 
1 . E . D'Arcy 'Human Acts ' p . 16-17 . 
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of one must be a consequence of the other. ccording to 
D'Arcy, MacBeth's stabbing of Duncan has the consequence 
of acBeth's killing of Duncan. However, acBeth's 
killing of Duncan cannot have the consequence of MacBeth's 
killing of Duncan. If A' is the consequence of A then it 
is surely quite evident that A cannot be (be identical 
with) A'. I am sure that no one needs persuading that 
nothing can be a consequence of itself. A consequence is 
an event or state of affairs which follows from something 
preceding. Obviously then the consequence and what it 
follows from cannot be identical. 
A does X with the result Y. This is acceptable. A 
is nevertheless said to be doing Y. This cannot be so. 
acBeth stabs Duncan. What is the result of that stabbing? 
The stabbing is an event. What other event or state of 
affairs follows from it and would not otherwise have 
occurred (at least not at that time and place) had not 
this action been performed? D'Arcy says the event would 
be MacBeth's killing of Duncan. This is where he is 
mistaken. If on this occasion the killing and the stabbing 
are identical actions then one does not follow from the 
other. What does, result is the death of Dwican. Thus 
MacBeth's stabbing Duncan had the result that Dwican died. 
Thus acBeth cannot be said to be doing Y here, as Y is 
the death of Duncan, or Duncan's dying. Occasionally 
Y could be an action, e.g. John's dropping a hammer on 
his toe (X), has the consequence that John swears (Y). 
However, it could never be, and the Identity thesis 
would never allow, that here X and Y are identical. 
This is clearly not the sort of case in which elision is 
supposed to be operating anyway. 
We can now see that the phenomenon of elision as 
envisaged by D'Arcy is a fictitious one. It does not 
afford the feared counter-example to the Identity thesis. 
D'Arcy's mistake originates in his failure (which is 
rather common in the philosophical discussion of action), 
to realise that a Y-type description is not a description 
of a consequence of an action, but rather a description 
of an action (a reference to it) in terms of consequences, 
i.e. as the cause of those consequences. In the case of 
"to kill 11 (and many other descriptions) this is disguised 
by the fact that the description is a conventional 1 short-
hand1 for "to cause the death of." 
Discussion of elision leads naturally into the 
consideration of the doctrine of basic actions. This 
theory, which divides actions into two distinct classes -
basic and non-basic - can be construed as a problem of 
property disparity of so-called identical actions because 
a basic action has some property which makes it basic 
which a non-basic action lacks (or vice versa), yet the 
Identity thesis often - in fact typically - allows that 
a basic action and a non-basic action are identical. 
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I hope to show that the distinction is fictitious, 
indeed that all actions are basic, none non-basic; that 
all have only the properties of basic actions, none of 
the properties credited to non-basic actions over and 
above these. This would allow cases of identity between 
a basic and a so-called non-basic action to be upheld in 
accordance with the Identity thesis. If the basic/non-
basic distinction is upheld then the Identity thesis is 
automatically disproved because this distinction 
presupposes the Many-Act thesis. Thus this is a more 
direct problem for the Identity thesis than property 
disparity, though the latter is involved and would of 
itself suffice to undermine the Identity thesis. 
1. According to Danto: "(l) Bis a basic action of 
~ if and only if (i) Bis an action and (ii) whenever 
~ performs B, there is no other action A, performed by 
~, such that Bis caused by A. 
"(2) Bis a non-basic action of s if there is some 
action A, performed by~, such that Bis caused by ti • 
We can see the relation this has to elision. It is 
in fact dealing with much the same subject matter, but 
Danto is coming to a different conclusion - one based on 
the any- ct thesis rather than the Identity thesis. 
The property which is unshared if say A(the basic action) 
is John's punching Jim and B(the non-basic action) is 
1. • Dante 'What We Can Do' p.435-6. 
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John's killing Jim, is that of having A for a cause. The 
concept of elision was not so clearly expressed but we 
discovered that it entailed an action A causing (or result-
ing in) an action Band yet wanted to hold that A was 
identical with B. If such a causal relation holds between 
and B then the basic action theory is obviously the right 
one, and the any- ct thesis wins the day. Thus we can see 
that this discussion is the next step in a logical train 
of enquiry, after consideration and repudiation of elision. 
When I press the button this is not a basic action. 
I moved my finger which caused my pressing of the button. 
The hand movement is a basic action. This is Danto's view 
of action. Clearly, in his view, all bodily movements 
which are deliberately performed (i.e. qualify as actions) 
are basic actions; all other actions are non-basic. In 
defence of the Identity thesis it must be shown that there 
is no such thing as a non-basic action. The idea of a 
basic action is acceptable, with the proviso that it is 
extended to all action, i.e. that all actions are acknow-
ledged to be basic. 
X swings his arm; X punches Y; X kills Y. Danto 
would allow the first to be called a basic action, the 
other two he would call non-basic. They are, for him, 
three separate, distinct actions. Let us try to discover 
how they differ one from the other. 
Clearly they are not different in the obvious way 
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that X's punching Y and X's kicking Y are. X' s punching 
is unambiguously a separate event from X's kicking. There 
is a different bodily movement involved. Danto would say 
that each was caused by a different basic action. With 
our three actions Danto would assume a causal chain, 
starting with the hand movement and ending with the act 
of killing. Undoubtedly only one basic action occurred; 
we would say only one action variously described. Now if 
the arm movement caused the punching then the arm movement 
cannot be, cannot constitute, the punching. We have 
established that any act must be an event. Therefore the 
punching must be an event, but it must be a different 
event from the arm movement. Danto is supported in this 
view by J. Cornman: 11 ••• people do such actions as sinking 
ships, and,it seems clear, such actions are not •mere move-
1. 
ments of the body.• " This is a common view amongst 
opponents of the Identity thesis and, at first encounter, 
seems a reasonable one. Let us consider however the 
simpler case of the punching. How could this be an event 
different from the movement of one's arm? A punching is 
never anything more than a striking with the fist. It 
just is an arm movement utilised in a certain way . There 
is no other event, a punching, which follows from the arm 
movement. Thus we have only one event which can be 
described in two ways. The arm movement and the punching 
are identical. 
1. J. Cornman. Reply to D. Davidson's ' Agency • p . 28. 
What of more ' complex ' actions though? What of the 
killing? Could this be a separate event from the arm 
movement, and be caused by the arm movement? Well, X 
could kill Y just by looking at him; by employing some 
occult force . We find this hard to believe, but even if 
it is so, it does not help Danto. I f X kills Yin this 
mysterious fashion then the arm movement has no place in 
the picture. It could in no way claim to cause the act 
of killing. What Danto would then have to say is that the 
occult act caused the killing, but again we need only ask 
where is the event - the act of killing - which is distinct 
from this 'act', the employment of the occult force. Once 
again there is no separate event. There is only one event 
and the act of killing is identical with the occult act. 
Thus even by entering into the realms of fantasy and 
utilising the dubious concept of a mental act Danto would 
be unable to defend his any- ct schema . 
Danto attempts to prove that raising one's hat must 
be a non-basic action. If he were successful he would 
establish the existence of a very extensive class of 
non- basic actions. He is convinced that proof of the 
basic nature of the act of raising one ' s hat depends on 
" ··· whether it is possible that we might move hats the 
way we do move our arms, not by causing them to move but 
by just moving them - the way~ move our arms: as basic 
1. 
actions." We need not argue along the lines he assumes 
1 • • Danto. ' What We Can Do ' p .439. 
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we must. Any Identity theorist will, I am sure, readily 
accept that we could never raise a hat without causing 
it to rise. Raising a hat just is causing it to rise. 
Danto is falling into the same trap as so many of his 
fellow philosophers. He is failing to distinguish 
between the act of raising one's hat and the movement of 
the hat, just as D' Arcy failed t o distinguish between the 
act of killing and the event which it caused - the death 
of the victim. Danto fails to realise that my raising my 
hat does not entail that the upward movement of my hat be 
a part of my action. It is not an action or any part of 
an action; it is a consequence of an action, something 
brought about or caused by an action. It is not sanething 
I do. By my arm movement I caused my hat to rise. I did 
nothing besides move my hand, I just did it in such a way 
as to cause my hat to rise with it. By his own argument 
Danto shows that we can do nothing, as opposed to cause 
something to happen, which is not a bodily movement. He 
does realise that nothing we do (as opposed to things we 
cause to happen) can be anything other than a bodily move-
ment, but he fails to realise how this disproves the 
notion of non-basic actions . 
Let us try to construct a weaker case than Danto ' s 
which salvages some distinction between basic and non-basic 
actions. Let us say that basic actions are always involved 
in - are a part of - non- basic actions, but that non-basic 
actions incorporate elements which are not present in 
basic actions. This would provide the contravention of 
Leibniz's Law which is all that is needed to be able to 
successfully deny the Identity thesis. Consider the act 
of moving one's hand and the act of killing. "Killing" 
involves the death of the victim, "moving one's arm" does 
not. Does this provide the required difference between 
these two acts to warrant denying that they are identical? 
The answer lies in the arena of action, in the world 
itself in which the action is performed. We need to be 
able to find something over and above what I did when I 
moved my arm which I did when I killed. Of course no such 
extra something will ever be found. If we look at the 
event which was my action we will see that it was an arm 
movement and that it had the consequence that my arm 
struck someone and that he then died. It is the same 
event referred to in the description of my act as a killing 
and in the description of it as an arm movement; the event 
referred to by each description has the same consequences. 
s we have seen before, the difference is in the descrip-
tion, not in the actions themselves. Thus even this very 
much weaker thesis of non-basic actions fails. 
It is worth noting that descriptions of actions can 
be divided into direct descriptions, i.e. descriptions 
of the bodily movement itself, and descriptions in terms 
of the consequences of the bodily movement, (shall we call 
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them indirect descriptions of the bodily movement.) 
The latter can themselves be divided into (i) descriptions 
in terms of consequences which the act was intended to 
cause, and which occurred; (ii) descriptions in terms of 
consequences which the act was intended to cause, but 
which failed to eventuate, and (iii) descriptions in terms 
of consequences caused by an act which were not intended 
(accidental). 
In the example of moving one's arm, punching, and 
killing, 11 X swung his arm 11 is a direct description of the 
bodily movement (the action), "X punched Y" is an indirect 
description of type (i), i.e. the consequence of one's 
fist contacting another's body was both planned and even-
tuated. 11X killed Y" could be an indirect description of 
type (ii) or of type (iii) depending on whether the conse-
quence of his action - the death of Y - was intended or 
not. If it was intended then his act could be redescribed 
as murder, if not then it was accidental and could only be 
described as manslaughter. We cannot tell, from the 
information embodied in the description of the act as a 
killing, which of these further descriptions is warranted. 
type (ii) indirect description would be "X bungled the 
catch. 11 Each of the four types of description brings a 
different aspect of the total context of events in which 
the action occurred, to the fore. We draw upon these 
distinctions within action description at a later stage. 
-~- ------
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Before leaving basic actions it is worth looking 
closely at the type of case which would most influence 
one in favour of belief in the existence of non-basic 
actions. Such an action description would be " moved 
stone S. 11 The problem is that though in fact we have 
both cause, i.e. a hand movement, and effect, i.e. move-
ment of the stone, these two are contemporaneous. The 
cause-effect pattern with which we are most familiar 
(and into which we are inclined to think all cause-effect 
situations should fit) is one where the cause event ends 
where the effect event begins. For example, the cause 
event is the -ball striking the Eight-ball. The effect 
event - the movement of the Eight-ball - occurs directly 
after the cause event (following on from it). However, 
many cause-effect situations start and finish together. 
When such a contemporaneous cause-effect situation 
occurs we are perfectly entitled to look upon the entire 
happening as but one event which features both the move-
ment of the hand and the movement of the stone. In fact 
this is the normal way of looking at what has occurred 
in such a case. Thus we seem to have only one event, 
yet according to the Identity thesis we should have both 
an action and its consequence (i.e. a cause and an effect) 
occurring here. Since there is only one event though, and 
it must be accepted that an action has been performed, we 
seem forced to conclude that here there was in fact no 
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consequence, but just an act. But since the event incor-
porates more than a simple bodily movement - i.e. the 
movement of the stone - the action (which is the event) 
must be a non-basic action, because it is an action but 
it fails to qualify as a basic action (i.e. a bodily 
movement only). Whether or not any basic action can be 
said to have caused this non-basic action is highly 
debatable, but this need not concern us because it can be 
shown that there is already a mistake made in the above 
argument which invalidates it and allows us to uphold the 
position that all actions are basic. 
What has been overlooked is that the notion of an 
event is an elastic one. There is in fact no way of 
counting the number of events which occur in a certain 
place during a certain time and hopi ng to get an absolute 
answer. The number of events counted would be relative 
to the viewpoint or purpose of the counter. If we ask 
how many events occurred in that landslide we may get the 
answer, just one, the whole landslide, or we may be told 
that the sliding of each rock was a separate event, or 
that each bounce of each rock on the way dovm was a 
separate event, and so on, thus we could be confronted 
with many different answers to our questions, all of 
which could claim to be equally correct. 
The concept of •event• shares this feature of relative 
countability with the concept of an object. It is 
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similarly impossible, in other words, to ever count the 
correct number of objects at any time and place. For 
instance, if we consider an occupied carpark and ask how 
many objects are in it, we may be given the number of cars 
there, or we may be given the number of component car 
parts present, and both answers would be correct. 
Applying this knowledge to our problem case, we can 
now understand that though we normally count only one 
event when we see moving stones, when we consider what 
occurs as an instance of a cause-effect situation, we are 
entitled to count two events; one being the movement of 
A's hand, the other being the movement of stone S. To 
suppose that there was no consequence present but only 
some feature of the action, when the stone moved, as we 
did above, is to suppose that the stone's movement was not 
caused by A, but done by A, which has already been shown 
to be impossible (while considering Danto). Thus we must 
allow that there are two events here if we are to preserve 
the very well-tried and bas,ic notion that we have of the 
cause-effect relation as it operates in the macroscopic 
world. 
Even this last-ditch defence of non-basic actions 
has failed. Non-basic actions do not and cannot exist . 
I will go so far as to say that a possible example of a 
non-basic action as defined by Danto cannot even be 
imagined. The notion of it does not make sense. All 
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actions are basic actions. Once again a problem which 
seemed to face the Identity thesis has been disposed of. 
With this discussion of basic actions we have moved 
beyond those problems based on property disparity and 
possible contravention of Leibniz's Law. In all cases 
where it has been claimed that two identical actions 
fail to have all properties in common, we have seen that 
the claim has been a false one. The principle of 
indiscernability of identicals has not been shown to be 
violated in any way. 
Let us now look at other types of problems confront-
ing the Identity thesis. 
It is another very basic feature of Identity that it 
is a symmetric, reflexive and transitive relation. 
Goldman1 • thinks that he can present examples which prove 
that so-called Identity between actions fails to have 
this feature (at least as far as symmetry and reflexivity 
are concerned). He considers the way in which "we often 
say of a person that he performs one act 1 by 1 performing 
another. We say,for example, that John turned on the 
light 1 by 1 flipping the switch ••••• As used in these 
contexts, the term 1 by 1 expresses a relation which holds 
between acts ••••• The important point to notice about 
this relationship is that it is both asymmetric and 
irreflexive." This is true. If S does I by doing A 
1. op.cit. p.5 
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then he cannot be said to be doing A by doing • Let 
us expand this. In examples of this kind A' will 
always be a description which makes mention (or includes 
words which are defined with mention) of consequences of 
the action, i.e. one of the types of indirect description. 
They could always be recast, without relevant change of 
meaning, into the form "caused •••• to occur" (in place 
of ttdid A' "). Thus when expanded, "S does A' by doing 
A" becomes "S caused E to happen by doing A" (where Eis 
some event which is a consequence of A). In a paradigm 
case will be a direct description, i.e. purely of a 
bodily movement (e.g. "X moved his hand"), though we 
often find that it is still an indirect description, 
but at a more primitive level (i.e. in terms of less far-
reaching consequences), than • To clarify; if the 
action originates a causal chain, then "A' 11 will always 
be a description in terms of consequences further along 
that chain than are the consequences in terms of which 
description"" is couched (though A need not be a direct 
description, i.e. of the bodily movement itself). For 
example, if A' is a killing then will be a manner of 
killing - a stabbing or a shooting etc. s Goldman points 
out, "we explain how act 'has been performed by citing 
A. ,,l. A' just says that in some way the agent caused 
this consequence. A tells us (to some extent) what that 
1. op • cit • p • 5 
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way was. That we cannot say that an agent did by 
doing I is not at all difficult to grasp, nor are the 
reasons for this being so. (Note that this has been 
discussed previously in connection with the locution 
11John 1 s killing Smith caused the gun to fire.") You 
cannot explain how X stabbed Y by saying he killed him. 
As has been explained (and needs no further explanation), 
must be at least one step back in the causal chain 
from A' for "S does A' by doing A" to be a sound explana-
tion (or any sort of explanation at all). Thus the 
relation which exists here, cannot, understandably, be 
symmetric. 
Similarly with the irreflexivity of the relation, 
we can clearly see how, though "S did A' by doing 11 is 
an explanation, "S did A by doing A (did ' by doing 1 ) 
is not. 
Thus one can fully understand why this relation 
between and 1 is both asymmetric and irreflexive. 
But does this prove that A and A' cannot be identical 
actions? No. The relation is not actually one between 
actions themselves. ctions are a bodily movement of a 
certain type. One action can never explain another, or 
itself (with the exception of speech acts) . Explanations 
are necessarily items of language . The relation of 
explanation holds between the statements "S did A' 11 and 
"S did A' by doing II If one looks outside of language 
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(including conventional gestures) in search of a 
relationship of explanation; if one looks for it in the 
world, existing between things of any kind, be they 
actions, other events, or any sort of object, then it 
will never be found because it does not exist in this 
realm, it only exists in language. 
Even if we did not have the above argument to refute 
Goldman's claim, we still would not need to worry about 
this problem. What in fact is maintained to be a feature 
of Identity is that it is a symmetrical and reflexive 
relation, i.e. that if X = Y, then Y = X and X = X and 
Y = Y. That there are other relations of some sort 
between X and Y which are not reflexive and symmetrical 
is not affected by this stipulation, i.e. if such 
relations pertain their presence will not disprove an 
identity claim because of this stipulation. Our argu-
ments have more than sufficed to prove that this is not 
a problem for the Identity thesis. 
Wiggins, in a volume on Identity, outlines a D 
thesis which states that "if someone tells you that 
s = b, then you should always ask them 'the same what 
as ]2? 1 The "what" which must be provided is a 
covering concept under which both sand .Q can be sub-
sumed. This is a sound thesis. If we just say that 
A and Bare the same we may mean many things. We may 
1. D. Wiggins. 'Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity' 
p.l. 
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mean they are the same person, or the same character-
type, and one of these could be true while the other 
is false. ost statements have the covering concept 
built in, either explicitly (e.g. "The Block mechanism 
is the stabili zing mechanism"), or implicitly, i . e . the 
referring phrases~ and~ being conventionally reserved 
for members of a certain class, e.g. "John Smith is the 
same as (is identical with) Lord Lush." Here the use of 
a Christian/ surname pair is conventionally restricted to 
people, thus we automatically register that the covering 
concept in this case is "person." 
Clearly the D thesis will apply to any identity 
statements. But consider the following case. Xis 
playing Y at chess. Just before he makes his move a fly 
settles on the chess board but is unnoticed by X. Then 
X sees a way to win the game and moves his queen into a 
position where it checkmates Y. In so doing he scares 
away the fly. Now the Identity thesis dictates that X's 
checkmating Y and X' s scaring away the fly are identical 
actions. However, with the D thesis in mind, we seem to 
have a problem . The defining characteristic of an action 
which differentiates it from other items of behaviour is 
that it be deliberate. This is satisfied by the act of 
checkmating Y. X had foreseen that his move would bring 
about the end of the game according to the rules of chess. 
But this is not the case with his scaring the fly. He 
did not even know that the fly was there, hence his 
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scaring it away was entirely accidental . It was not 
something he did deliberately it seems. This being the 
case, it would seem that what he did in scaring the fly 
cannot be called an action, therefore f , the covering 
concept in the identity statement "X ' s checkmating Y was 
the same f as X' s scaring the fly•; cannot be ''action . " 
Which of course means that we cannot say that these are 
identical actions, they are identical somethings, but not 
actions. If this line of argument is sound then the 
Identity thesis cannot be accepted, at least not in its 
present form, because it woul d allow that these are two 
identical actions. The covering concept in this case would 
have to be "bodily movement" (as both sand .l2 can qualify 
as descriptions of a bodily movement), and we may be better 
advised to call our thesis the Identity thesis of bodily 
movement. Of course, even this is doubtful. Ifs is an 
action (which checkmating Y is) and Q is not, and there 
is a real (not a fictitious or relative) difference 
between actions and non- actions (as we have determined is 
the case), then b must lack something which~ has and 
therefore they surely cannot be identical. 
The point which the above argument has overlooked is 
that the two descriptions refer to one movement and it is 
the inclusion or otherwise of a certain feature - i . e . 
deliberate performance - in the makeup of that movement 
which determines whether or not it is an action. This 
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issue is not in any way effected by the inadequacies of 
the descriptions of the event concerned. It does not 
matter that the description of the event as scaring a 
fly does not, in isolation, allow one to determine 
whether the event described is an action or not. Because 
the necessary defining characteristic is not mentioned 
in this description, it does not mean that it does not 
occur in the event which it describes. Thus we can see 
why we need not worry about "A" and "A' "not being sub-
ject to the same problems (e.g. of being unmistakably 
action descriptions) in this, and like, cases. 
This explanation also allows us to uphold the 
covering concept 11action" for the identity statement and 
thus preserve the unamended Identity thesis. It is not 
disputed that what is described by A and A' is the same 
bodily movement. From the descrfption of the movement 
as a checkmating it is clear that the movement was 
deliberately performed (assume so at least), and was 
therefore an action, and an action with a purpose. This 
allows us to state that any description of that movement 
will necessarily be describing an action, though in the 
case of many such descriptions we would not if we 
encountered them in isolation, be able to infer from 
them that they did in fact describe an action. Their 
occurrence in a context may often render such an infer-
ence possible. Thus, in an action identity statement, 
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in any sort of identity statement at all, we only need to 
know of one description of the object or event, or what-
ever, which is definitely that of an action (i.e. conveys 
the presence of the required defining characteristic) to 
be able to use the covering concept "action", or "person" 
or whatnot in any identity statement about that entity 
under any (true) description whatsoever. 
The description which can be unmistakably recognised 
as action descriptions regardless of context (i.e. the 
unambiguous action descriptions), are small in number. 
There are the basic ones such as "John moved his arm 
forward deliberately" which are direct descriptions. 
There are the indirect ones such as "John murdered Bill" 
which identify some movement of an agent as one which was 
deliberately designed to have certain consequences. 
urders, defraudings, assaults, promises cannot be 
accidental by definition. Killings, stabbings, insults, 
could be either deliberate or accidental. They could be 
descriptions in terms of unforseen consequences of an 
action which can be unambiguously described as another 
type of action (in terms of intended consequences, 
whether the intention was realised or not) or in terms 
of forseen and eventuating consequences, or descriptions 
of movements which were not even actions at all - e.g. 
I could be said to have killed a man if I fell over and 
in so doing bumped into a bystander, knocking him under a 
bus. 
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When an identity statement includes two of these 
ambiguous descriptions, e.g. "John's killing Bill is 
identical with John's pushing Bill under a bus" we must 
have additional evidence before we can determine whether 
this is an action identity statement, or merely a bodily 
movement identity statement. We must be able to des-
cribe the event concerned with an unambiguous action 
description (e.g. as murder) and every action must be 
able to be so described, though it may be a rather con-
torted description for many actions. 
Thus one description, or even both, in a statement 
of identity between actions need not be a self-evident 
action description so long as we know the event under 
some such self-evident action description. 
An identity statement involving one description in 
terms of unforseen consequences, and another in terms of 
forseen and intended consequences can employ the covering 
concept "action." The introduction of the D thesis has 
not presented an insurmountable problem for the Identity 
thesis. 
Another problem which revolves around descriptions 
concerns conventional behaviour (of which language is the 
major part, in fact one could class all items of conven-
tional behaviour as a form of language, or at least as a 
primitive precursor or substitute for it). An item of 
behaviour, a bodily movement (a characterisation which 
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can be interpreted loosely enough so that speech acts 
can be included) can conventionally have a certain meaning, 
be interpreted in a certain standard way. The problem is 
that an exactly similar movement may not have been per-
formed .a§. a conventional act. It may not even have been 
an act at all. This may need explanation but it does not 
affect the Identity thesis because although exactly simi-
lar, the two actions concerned are still distinct actions. 
There is no suggestion that they be identical. closely 
related case does however provide the desired example. 
What if it were one and the same movement in the above 
case? Let us try to imagine such a case. 
Suppose Stanley had come across a tribe of primitive 
natives. They jabber threateningly at him because, 
unbeknown to Stanley, he has offended against one of their 
taboos. In great fear his teeth begin to chatter, and for 
some reason the natives become suddenly very friendly. 
Stanley does not realise it, but for this tribe, the 
chattering of one's teeth signifies that one comes in 
friendship bearing great gifts. Thus as far as they are 
concerned, he has made the conventional sign that he is 
friendly etc. They would describe the chattering of 
Stanley's teeth as the act of friendly greeting. tanley 
would deny that he has performed any action at all. s 
far as he is concerned something has happened to him, 
namely he has been affected by uncontrollable fear. 
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Could it be said that Stanley's teeth-chattering is 
identical with the act of friendly greeting? If so, we 
cannot use the covering concept "action 11 here. If there 
is a real distinction between actions and non-actions 
then we could not even claim identity between these two 
because the act of friendly greeting must be something 
more than the teeth-chattering which is a mere bodily 
movement lacking the defining characteristic of an action. 
The solution is in recognising the fact that Stanley 
performed llQ act whatsoever. The natives mistakenly 
thought that he was ritually greeting them in a friendly 
fashion. He was not. What must be kept in mind is that 
one can only act conventionally knowingly. One must know 
the conventions and intend to act in the required way and 
believe that those watching (or listening) also know the 
conventions. Thus one must know the meaning of the word 
"promise" and its status as a conventional act and have 
reason to believe that those conventions hold jurisdiction 
over the society you are acting in, if one is actually to 
perform the act of promising by uttering "I promise to ••• " 
Like other acts then, a conventional act must be 
deliberate, intended, and, to have the consequences which 
entail that it is a conventional act, it needs the further 
features that it be understood by both actor and audience 
to be an item of behaviour with conventional significance. 
Goldman cites speech acts as a counter-example to 
the Identity thesis. 1 • I n How To Do Things With Words 
ustin picks out a variety of acts in language. The 
three basics are locutionary acts, illocutionary acts 
and perlocutionary acts. Goldman is convinced that 
ustin would support him in saying that when a man makes 
a language noise he can be performing three distinct 
acts. In fact ustin did not consider whether there 
might be identity or not between these acts - i.e. 
whether there was on such an occasion only one act, or 
three separate acts. If we look carefully at them 
however we can see that they are all but different 
descriptions of the same act. man makes a language 
noise, he utters a sentence which has meaning; this is 
a locutionary act. If he makes the utterance for some 
purpose - e.g. to command, announce, order - then it 
also qualifies as an illocutionary act. If it evokes 
a response from a person who hears it (even if it is 
not the one the utterer had hoped for, e.g. I may warn 
you, but you laugh, finding it a joke) then it also 
qualifies as - and deserves the title of - perlocution-
ary act. Examples are deceiving, irritating, impressing. 
This is a roughly sketched outline of the Austin thesis. 
In fact these labels just fix one and the same speech 
act in a progressively broadening context of intention 
and consequence and can be explained in much the same 
1. op.cit.p.10. 
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way as we explained various descriptions of ordinary 
actions. Thus speech acts fit neatly and without fuss 
into the general body of actions and put no new stumbling 
blocks in the way of the Identity thesis. 
The point might be raised, as a criticism of the 
Identity thesis, that in many cases one ends up saying 
that one action is identical with a number of actions . 
For instance, one says "Launching the boat is identical 
with removing the chocks, cutting the ropes, breaking a 
champagne bottle on the bow, and pushing the boat down 
the ramp. 11 This is not though a unique feature of action 
Identity. Do we not likewise say "The Smith family is 
identical with J im, and olly, and Clyde."? We can 
postulate identity between sets of actions. It just 
happens that we can say that the launching of a boat is 
a set of actions, or a single action, depending on how 
we want to look at it. In much the same way we can look 
at the same vista and see it as one mountain range or as 
many separate peaks. We know that we can get various 
totals if we count a group of events, and as actions are 
a species of event, the same, naturally, applies to 
actions. The number of actions, events, or objects 
which we choose to say are present at any place and time 
will be relative to our point of view, though we can 
not proliferate actions - and therefore events - in the 
way the any- ct thesis would allow . ( ote also that 
this relativity does not apply to the distinction between 
actions and non-actions, objects and non-objects - these 
are real and fixed boundaries - and we are not here saying 
that it does.) 
Before moving on it should be noted that there is a 
distinction between actions and activities. hen one 
explains what one does, did, or will do, one need not be 
describing an act (or any single movement such as rolling 
over in one's sleep). One could say that one works at 
Woolworths, runs a farm, which are activities, not actions. 
Such examples as slapping someone's face, saluting, throwing 
a stone, are undoubtedly actions. However, there is a large 
region between such examples where it is difficult to decide 
whether one is dealing with cases of actions or activities, 
i.e. whether one can still apply the term "action" to 
something one does or whether it must always be considered 
a number of actions(which, broadly speaking, is an activity). 
The yardstick by which the judgement is made is time span. 
Something which persists will be an activity. Something 
which is relatively shortlived is an action. I cannot 
give any more accurate idea of what the limit of an action 
time span is, however we all seem to be able to apply the 
distinction between actions and activities with reasonable 
common agreement regardless of its rather vague nature. 
Rightly or wrongly a Relativity thesis has been 
postulated in connection with "normal" (mainly object) 
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identity. The same sort of case should be able to be 
built for action identity. In fact it is not. But if 
actions are identical in the same sense of the term as 
objects are identical then corresponding cases should 
be forthcoming. The lack of them can be explained 
however without our having to accept that identity 
between actions is somehow a different concept from 
identity between objects. 
The examples upon which the Relativists base their 
case are mainly those involving objects at different 
1. 
stages in their long life spans. The boy John is the 
same person as the ayor, Sir John Smith, but he is not 
the same man - because he is not a man, only a boy. 
Such examples clearly depend on the persistence of 
objects . Corresponding cases are lacking in the field 
of actions because, as noted above, actions are short-
lived, are not persisting. Anything which we do which 
is persisting, which does last for a reasonably lengthy 
period of time, is an activity, not an action. 
There are cases, such as certain killings, which 
seem odd. For example, suppose I purposely injected a 
man with a compound which I knew would induce a fatal 
cancer in him . Now my one act - the injecting of this 
compound into the man - was the very same act as my 
killing the man, but I could not call this act killing 
1 . see Wiggins. Part II & III. 
for a long time after I could call it an injecting of the 
compound. This need not upset the Identity theorist if 
he remembers that 11 to kill" means "to cause the death of. 11 
Obviously the act cannot be described as causing a death 
until the death occurred. This is no mystery, and nor is 
the fact that I do not know that this description is 
warranted without some evidence. Thus we can now see that 
there is no real oddness about this example if we persist 
in upholding the Identity thesis. 
On the other hand, if the injecting and the killing 
were two separate actions, as anyone who rejects the 
Identity thesis would be forced to maintain, there is a 
considerabl y more persis tent oddness about this example. 
Unless I gain additional evidence - e.g. I see the man die, 
or read of his death in the newspapers - I will not even 
know that I have performed this distinct action of killing. 
But by definition an action is deliberately performed. 
This entails that we know we are performing any and every 
action. In fact, for most actions, as was previously 
explained, the awareness that we have performed an action 
is stronger than just knowing. Those borderline cases 
where we are uncertain are very different sorts of 
examples than the one we are dealing with here. There is 
no doubt here, if we accept the Identity thesis, that we 
have performed the action, only doubt as to whether it 
has a certain consequence. If the Identity thesis is 
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rejected, there will be a time, after the man's death, 
when we are much more certain of having killed than we 
ever are that we have performed one of the borderline 
actions. Anyway we are doubting in a different way. 
We have no doubt that the killing is an action, we are 
only doubtful as to whether we have performed it (if we 
are any- ct theorists), in a borderline case we know 
when whatever happened happened, but we are not sure 
whether or not it was an action. 
Thus if the Identity thesis is rejected (while the 
normal definition of an action is accepted) we have the 
contradiction of having performed an action and not 
knowing that we have done so. This is much more than 
mere oddness. The Identity thesis allows us to avoid 
this contradiction and to explain away any oddness, thus 
proving that it is much superior to the any-Act thesis. 
To deny the Identity thesis in this case is to fall into 
contradiction, unless a different characterisation of 
action is produced - a task which Goldman and Co. do not 
attempt, and a task which I am sure would end in failure. 
If we return to the case of X checkmating Y and X 
scaring the fly and amend it a little we strike a new 
problem. What if X knew that the fly was on the chess 
board and wanted to scare it away. He also saw the 
opening for his queen and wanted to checkmate Y. Being a 
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lazy fellow he calculates that he could achieve both 
these purposes by moving his queen to kings-knight 
three. He makes the move and proves his calculations 
correct. He both scares away the fly and checkmates Y. 
Both the departure of the fly and Y's admission of 
defeat were forseen consequences of something X did. 
Both were intended. Did X perform two actions or only 
one? This is a very important question because if he 
has performed two actions then we have a case of two 
actions corresponding to but one bodily movement, one 
event. If this could be upheld then the Identity thesis 
would be seriously undermined, because it is basic to my 
conception of the Identity thesis (I think any conception 
of it) that an action be merely a type of bodily move-
ment, that every action should be a distinct event in its 
own right. If it can be shown that there can be two 
actions performed where only one event occurred, then it 
can no longer be said that an action is an event - a 
bodily movement of a special sort. ost of my argumenta-
tion in defence of the Identity thesis would collapse 
because it is based on, and depends for its soundness on, 
the supposition that actions are a species of event. 
One cannot argue that there are two events to account 
for the two actions by subdividing the movement which X 
made into two parts. He need not have raised the queen 
and waved it at the fly before moving it to its new 
72. 
location on the board, or made any such gesture with the 
piece. We will assume that he made a smooth and 
uninterrupted movement with his hand, just as he always 
does when moving a chess piece, and that it was the whole 
movement which alarmed the fly and caused it to fly away. 
This leaves no possibility that the first half of the 
movement scared the fly and the second half repositioned 
the queen so that it trapped Y' s king (a poor argument in 
any event). Even if, taking advantage of the afore-
mentioned property of events which allows one to count 
them in different ways with different results, we 
artificially divide the hand movement into a number of 
events (saying for instance that the queen's passing over 
each square of the board is a separate event) it will not 
avoid the consequence of there being more actions than 
events because each of these events would have its share 
of responsibility for the scaring of the fly and the 
checkmating of the king, thus being in the same predica-
ment . 
If we look to common usage we will often encounter 
the claim "I killed two birds with one stone." Can we 
not similarly say that one can accomplish two purposes 
with the same action? Sir Gawain kill ed the villain and 
won the heart of a fair lady with one stroke of his sword. 
Surely a chronicler of the scene would say that with one 
mighty action Sir Gawain accomplished both his intenti ons? 
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With our definition of an action as a type of bodily 
movement we can "stick to our guns" and claim that this 
is just what should always be said and that there is 
nothing wrong with fulfilling two intentions with one 
action. Surely most actions which we perform do have 
more than one purpose? X moved his queen so that he 
would defeat Y, whom he disliked, and so humiliate him, 
and also so that he could collect the prize money, which 
he needed to pay for his new yacht. similar duality 
exists for most actions. 
The fact is emerging that the dispute between the 
view that each action is a separate event (under at 
least one legitimate method of counting events) and the 
view that there need be no one - one correspondence 
between events and actions (i.e. that actions are not a 
species of event) is to some extent a dispute over rival 
conventions, with neither side absolutely correct. If 
one chooses one convention one maintains that one action 
can have more than one purpose; if one adopts the other 
convention one maintains that there can be only one 
purpose for each action but that there can be a number 
of actions corresponding (somehow) to one event and hence 
that actions are not a species of event. 
When one deals with other disputes over conventions 
which arise in philosophical discussion, it is notable 
that the adoption of either of the rival conventions 
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leads to no repercussions. Either of the two would fit 
comfortably into our present conceptual framework (with 
the exception of the concept which fails to accommodate 
either convention in its original form, but it can be 
slightly amended in one way or the other to accommodate 
one or other of the conventions). This does not apply 
with the dispute we are considering here . The convention 
of one act having many purposes rests on the prior 
assumption of the Identity thesis . The convention that 
one act can have only one purpose assumes the any-Act 
thesis. Our investigations have shown us that the any-
ct thesis is incompatible with our world view - and the 
conceptual framework which supports it - in a number of 
ways. On the other hand, the Identity thesis has 
presented no such problems. It is perfectly compatible 
with all our other concepts and the world picture which 
these enable us to construct. Thus the convention which 
presupposes the Identity thesis is a convention which 
fits the requirements for it to be a candidate for 
inclusion into our conceptual schema. The rival conven-
tion, based on the any- ct thesis, cannot meet such 
requirements. Its acceptance would entail at least a 
major overhaul of some of our most cherished concepts 
(perhaps even the discarding of them) and there is no 
guarantee that any such overhaul would or could result 
in a coherent and self-consistent conceptual schema to 
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rival the one which we have now. Hence, in the accepted 
philosophical sense (outlined above) of a clash of con-
ventions, the case we are dealing with here cannot be 
construed as a dispute between rival conventions. 
One action can have many purposes. This is the 
conclusion which the above discussion leads us to come 
to. We can have confidence in the soundness of this 
conclusion, though it is not necessarily the only correct 
one. There still, I suppose, remains the very remote 
possibility (though we may be highly sceptical of this) 
that a rival world picture of comparable explanatory 
power and lucidity could be constructed which would 
accommodate the any-Act thesis, and consequently the 
restriction that one act can have but one purpose. 
This though would be to reverse the obvious rational 
procedure (even in the very unlikely event that it did 
prove possible) - one might say that it constitutes 
setting a mackerel to catch a sprat. 
The overhaul of our whole conceptual framework (which 
must follow from the radical alterations entailed by the 
any- ct thesis) thus presents Goldman, and anyone else 
who denies the Identity thesis, with the means for a very 
extreme and far-fetched last-ditch defence. However, no 
such defence has been offered. All the philosophers -
whose arguments touching this dispute I have encountered 
- who dir ectly or indirectly oppose the Identity thesis, 
have chosen to come to the enemy as it were. They all 
accept without question our present world picture. 
They are all convinced that their any- ct thesis is 
compatible with this world picture while the Identity 
thesis is not, and all their arguments are designed to 
show this. We have discovered that in fact, quite the 
contrary is the actual state of affairs. 
In considering all the problems which were said to 
confront the Identity thesis it was found that they 
actually presented no insurmountable difficulties. On 
the other hand, it soon became obvious that many such 
difficulties beset the any- ct thesis - which is the 
only logical alternative to the Identity thesis. 
The inescapable conclusion of our investigations is 
that the ·any- ct thesis is incompatible with the body 
of concepts with which we operate, and that the only 
viable solution to the problem of the individuation of 
actions, within the limits accepted by both sides of 
the dispute, is to accept the Identity thesis. 
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